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Abstract Inhibitory control has been suggested as a key
predictive measure of problem-solving skills in human and
nonhuman animals. However, there has yet to be a direct
comparison of the inhibitory skills of the nonhuman apes
and their development in human children. We compared
the inhibitory skills of all great ape species, including
3–5-year-old children in a detour-reaching task, which
required subjects to avoid reaching directly for food and
instead use an indirect reaching method to successfully
obtain the food. We tested 22 chimpanzees, 18 bonobos, 18
orangutans, 6 gorillas and 42 children. Our sample included
chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans housed in zoos
(N = 27) and others housed in sanctuaries in their native
habitats (N = 37). Overall, orangutans were the most skilful
apes, including human children. As expected older children
outperformed younger children. Sanctuary chimpanzees
and bonobos outperformed their zoo counterparts whereas
there was no diVerence between the two orangutan samples.
Most zoo chimpanzees and bonobos failed to solve the
original task, but improved their performance with addi-
tional training, although the training method determined to
a considerable extent the level of success that the apes
achieved in a transfer phase. In general, the performance of
the older children was far from perfect and comparable to
some of the nonhuman apes tested.
Keywords Problem solving · Inhibitory control · 
Reaching · Detour
Introduction
Everyday animals face countless problem-solving situa-
tions. One of the key ingredients of successful problem-
solving is the inhibition of certain prepotent responses that
exist because they are either preprogrammed or have been
extensively reinforced in the past. Developmental studies
on animals and children have shown that inhibitory
problems, rather than a lack of conceptual comprehension,
can often prevent subjects from solving certain tasks
(e.g., Deacon 1997; Diamond 1990).
Numerous species have been observed to perform well
on detour tasks in which they have to walk around a barrier
(e.g., fence) to obtain food or a social reward (chimpanzees:
Köhler  1925; Kellog and Kellog 1933; chicks: Regolin
et al. 1994, 1995a; cats: Poucet Thinus-Blanc and Chapuis
1983; dogs: Pongracz et al. 2001; quokkas: Wynne and
Leguet 2004; quails, canaries and herring gulls: Zucca et al.
2005; Wsh: Bisazza et al. 1997; snails: Atkinson 2003). It is
very likely that species diVer in the way they solve this
task. Snails, for example, rely on sensory feedback while
moving along a barrier, whereas 2-day-old chicks have
been reported to solve detour tasks in their initial choice,
although some evidence suggest that they may perform bet-
ter in seeking social partners than prey (Regolin et al.
1995b). Nevertheless, there are some task features to which
various species respond in similar ways. Thus, comparisons
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of the behavior in front of transparent and opaque barriers
with various species (chicks: Regolin et al. 1994; cats:
Poucet et al. 1983; dogs: Chapuis et al. 1983) have con-
Wrmed an early Wnding of Köhler (1925) with chimpanzees,
that transparent barriers pose a more diYcult problem than
opaque ones.
In contrast to detour problems in which subjects have to
move around a barrier themselves, Köhler (1925) showed
that chimpanzees perform poorly when pushing an object
around a barrier. However, later studies have found that
chimpanzees and other primates can solve mechanical
mazes, computerized mazes, and bent-wire detour prob-
lems that require the inhibition of direct solutions and the
activation of alternative indirect routes (Bingham 1929;
Guillaume and Meyerson 1930; Davis et al. 1957; Davis
1958,  1968; Washburn and Rumbaugh 1992; Washburn
et al. 1991). One of the tasks that has received considerable
research attention in connection to the ability to inhibit pre-
potent responses is the detour-reaching task or object
retrieval task. In this task, a toy is placed into a plexiglass
box, with an opening only to one side only (Diamond
1981). When 7–9-month-old human infants see the toy
through the closed plexiglass side of the box, they will
reach straight for it, despite tactile feedback from the plexi-
glass. In contrast to 9-month-olds, older infants Wnd the
opening of the box (Diamond 1990). When tested with
an opaque box, 7–9-month-old infants perform better
(Diamond 1981, 1990), suggesting that the visibility of the
attractive toy evokes the urge to reach for it directly. In
several studies Diamond has shown that performance on the
object retrieval task is linked to maturation of the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Diamond and Goldman-Rakic
1986; Diamond 1991a, b).
Adult rhesus monkeys, marmosets and vervet monkeys
easily Wnd the opening of the object retrieval box (Diamond
and Goldman-Rakic 1989; Roberts et al. 1991; Taylor et al.
1990a, b). In contrast, cotton-top tamarins fail to perform
above chance in this task (and continue reaching directly)
even after 24 trials (Santos et al. 1999). However, given
suYcient experience that included a training phase with an
opaque box, tamarins were also able to overcome their ini-
tial diYculties and solve the reaching problem.
Surprisingly, performance in object-reaching tasks has
yet to be examined in the great apes. This lack of informa-
tion about humans’ closest living relatives is particularly
puzzling because increases of prefrontal cortex have been
postulated in human evolution as key development in exec-
utive problem-solving and forward-planning. Crucially, the
great apes, rather than the monkeys that have been tested,
are the group that displays the largest prefrontal cortex in
nonhuman primates (see Semendeferi 1999). Therefore,
data on great apes’ performance is crucial to make infer-
ences about the evolution of inhibitory skills in humans.
Moreover, obtaining data from all great ape species, not
just one species (e.g., chimpanzees) is essential to make
inferences about the evolution of human and ape cognitive
skills (see Beck 1982; Parker et al. 1999). A joint appraisal
could help to infer points where this capability may have
increased.
Some authors have suggested that orangutans rather than
our closest relative, the chimpanzee, possess greater inhibi-
tory skills. For instance, Shumaker et al. (2002) found that
two orangutans solved a reversed contingency task that
chimpanzees had systematically failed (Boysen and
Berntson 1995; Boysen et al. 1996). However, the study by
Shumaker et al. (2002) has been criticized because orangu-
tans showed no initial preference for the larger quantity,
and, therefore, they did not have to inhibit reaching for the
larger quantity of food (Kralik et al. 2002; Vlamings et al.
2006). Moreover, Vlamings et al. (2006) (see also Uher and
Call 2008) tested all the great apes in a reverse contingency
task and found no evidence of the putative diVerences
between chimpanzees and orangutans. Some orangutans
(and chimpanzees) passed the task while some orangutans
(and chimpanzees) failed it. Note that some monkeys, if
given enough trials, can also pass this task even without
using correction procedures (Albiach-Serrano et al. 2007;
Murray et al. 2005).
The aim of the current study was to compare the ability
of great apes to solve a modiWed version of the classical
detour-reaching task taking great care to use the same
method with all species. This is important because
although data from multiple species is available, for
instance in the case of the classical detour task, quite often
inter-species comparisons are diYcult to interpret because
the methods used to study each species also diVer substan-
tially. Upon completing our Wrst experiment, we con-
ducted a follow-up with those apes that initially failed the
task to assess the reasons for their failure and to see if a
minimum amount of training would help them overcome
their initial bias. Since the current study also included
apes from two diVerent captive populations (zoo and
sanctuary), we investigated whether the origin of the apes
had an eVect on performance. This comparison is impor-
tant to map the inter-population diVerences in cognition—
a topic that has received relatively little research attention
(but see Bania et al. 2009; Call and Tomasello 1996; Fur-
long et al. 2008). Finally, we tested 3–5-year-old children
on the same task as this age represents a key transition
period as evidenced by neurological and behavioral stud-
ies. Neurological studies reported that the prefrontal
lobe—an area implicated in the inhibition of prepotent
responses, shows an important growth spurt between the
age of 4 and 4 years (Luria 1973; Huttenlocher 1979;
Thatcher  1992). Among the major changes detected
during this period are the development in the size andAnim Cogn (2010) 13:273–285 275
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complexity of cells, which include myelinisation, Wssura-
tion and synaptic density (Carver et al. 2001a).
Behavioral studies have indicated that 3–4-year-old chil-
dren perform poorly on a variety of tasks requiring inhibi-
tory control, including the day–night task (Gerstadt et al.
1994; Diamond et al. 2002), the tapping-imitation task
(Luria 1973; Diamond and Taylor 1996), the delay of grati-
Wcation task (Mischel and Mischel 1983; Mischel et al.
1989) and the dimensional card-sorting task (Frye et al.
1995). However, there is a marked improvement in inhibi-
tory control between 3 and 5 years of age (Carlson and
Moses 2001; Kopp 1982; Zelazo and Frye 1998). Livesey
and Morgan (1991) administered a go/no-go task to 4- and
5-year-old children, and found that performance was near
perfect in latter age group. Further it has been reported that
the preschool period is an important period for the develop-
ment of inhibitory skills as measured by the stop-signal task
(Carver et al. 2001a, b) in which subjects have to inhibit
their responses following an auditory signal in a forced
choice discrimination task. Even the youngest age group
(children between 4- and 9-year-old were tested) had some
capacity of withholding responses, and performance
improved signiWcantly with age, in particular in the youn-
gest age group. According to Bell and Livesey (1985)
inhibitory behavior is linked to self regulation, the develop-
ment of which is reported to be an important milestone in
the young child (Kopp 1982; Lee et al. 1983). As far as we
know, there have been no studies that investigate inhibitory
control in preschool children in a problem-solving setting.
Additionally, except for the study of Carlson et al. (2002)
there have been no studies that directly compare inhibitory
skills among 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds. Based on the previous
studies we expected older children to show superior perfor-
mance than younger children in the detour-reaching task
used in this study.
Experiment 1: zoo apes
Methods
Subjects
We tested 27 great apes housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Pri-
mate Research Center (WKPRC) in Leipzig (Germany).
There were 6 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla; age range 5–25 years;
2 males, 4 females), 7 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus; age
range 5–33 years; 2 males, 5 females), 4 bonobos (Pan
paniscus; age range 6–20 years; 3 males, 1 female) and
10 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; age range 5–27 years;
3 males, 7 females). All animals had participated in
various experimental cognitive studies at the WKPRC (see
http://wkprc.eva.mpg.de). Subjects were not food deprived
prior or during the experiment and water was available
ad libitum during the experiment. We included all subjects
older than 3 years of age that were available for testing at
the time.
Materials
The apparatus consisted of a bottomless opaque wooden
box (50 £ 53 £ 30 cm) resting on a platform and attached
to the mesh by a metal frame (see Fig. 1a). The front panel
of the box had two transparent Plexiglas doors
(18 £ 18 cm2) suspended by hinges and that opened
inwards when pushed. We used transparent doors because
several studies had shown that several species Wnd transpar-
ent barriers more challenging than opaque ones (e.g.,
Chapuis et al. 1983; Diamond 1990; Regolin et al. 1994). The
mesh contained two large holes that coincided with the box
doors through which the animal could stick his or her entire
arm. A 5-cm piece of banana could be placed right behind
one of the hinged doors via one of two lateral trap doors,
which were out of reach of the subject. An opaque plexi-
glass panel (80 £ 90 cm) blocked the subject’s access to
the hinged doors during baiting. This prevented the subject
from seeing where the food was placed. In one of the condi-
tions, the banana was covered by a small opaque cup (5 cm
in diameter and 6 cm in height). If the subject tried to reach
for the food directly, the door pushed the food away and the
reward fell out of reach from the subject. To get the reward,
subjects had to reach indirectly, through the empty door
and grab the reward from behind (see Fig. 1b). Two
cameras recorded testing. One camera was placed under-
neath the box, the other one at the side. The signal of both
cameras was fed to a single tape in a DV-walkman.
Procedure
Each subject was tested individually in an observation
room, except for one orangutan and three chimpanzees that
were accompanied by their young oVspring. At the begin-
ning of each trial, the experimenter installed an opaque
panel and placed a piece of banana behind either the left or
right door of the box. In the visible condition the reward
was fully visible whereas in the invisible condition, the
experimenter covered the reward with an upside down
opaque cup. Including trials in the visible and invisible con-
ditions allowed us to assess whether seeing the reward
made the problem harder than not seeing it. After baiting
was completed, the experimenter removed the opaque panel
and sat down approximately 1 m behind the box. Subjects
were allowed to approach the box and take the food by
reaching through the doors (see Fig. 1b). The trial ended
when subjects got or lost the food. Then the opaque panel
was lowered again and the next trial was conducted. If276 Anim Cogn (2010) 13:273–285
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subjects failed to respond to the box, they were vocally
encouraged to do so. If subjects did not respond after 5 min,
the session was terminated. Testing stopped after subjects
became unwilling to participate on three consecutive ses-
sions. All sessions were videotaped.
Design
We used a 4 (species) £ 2 (condition: visible/invisible)
split plot, with species as the between and condition as the
within subjects factor. The order, in which the conditions
were presented, was counterbalanced within species. Each
condition consisted of ten trials [5 trials for each food loca-
tion (left/right)]. The order of food location was counterbal-
anced across trials using a randomization program, with the
obligation that food was never on the same location three
times in a row. Subjects were tested in two sessions (one
per condition), each run on a diVerent day. The median
number of days between conditions was one.
Data scoring and analyses
We scored from the videotapes whether subjects obtained
the reward. A second observer coded 20% of the sessions.
Inter-observer reliability was excellent (Cohen’s kappa =
0.94). We analyzed the percent of correct trials as a func-
tion of species, condition and sex. We used nonparametric
statistics because the assumption of homogeneity of vari-
ance was not met. We corrected multiple pair-wise compar-
isons with the Bonferroni–Holm procedure (Holm 1979).
Results
Two chimpanzees and one bonobo were dropped from the
analysis because they did not complete the two sessions.
Figure 2 presents the percentage of correct trials as a func-
tion of species. There were no signiWcant diVerences
between conditions. Consequently, we collapsed this vari-
able in subsequent analyses. There were signiWcant diVer-
ences between species (Kruskal–Wallis test: 2 = 17.52;
df =3 ;  P = 0.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that
orangutans outperformed all other species (Mann–Whitney
tests: Z > 2.71; P < 0.01 in all cases). Males and females
performed at comparable levels (Mann–Whitney test:
Z=0.59; P = 0.55). Unlike other species, orangutans sig-
niWcantly improved their performance during testing from
29% correct in the Wrst 5-trial block to 91% correct in the
last 5-trial block (Friedman test: 2 =1 4 . 2 2 ;   df =3 ;
P = 0.003). Only one out of seven orangutans solved the
problem in the Wrst trial, although she subsequently missed
other trials (no subject from any other species solved the
problem on their Wrst trial). We found no evidence that age
aVected performance in orangutans (Spearman r =0 . 0 7 ;
P =0 . 8 8 ;   N =7 ) .
Discussion
Orangutans outperformed all other great ape species.
Although initially they also performed poorly, unlike other
species, they learned to inhibit reaching directly for the
reward within 20 trials. It is conceivable that this reXects the
more developed inhibitory skills of orangutans as some
authors have suggested (Shumaker et al. 2002, but see
Vlamings et al. 2006). Perhaps the reason for their success is
Fig. 1 Experimental setup (a) and solution to the task (b)
Fig. 2 Mean percentage (+SEM) of correct trials as a function of spe-
cies in “Experiment 1”
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due to the fact that they were not pulled as strongly by the
food as their African counterparts which face stronger food
competition with group mates (Shumaker et al. 2002). Addi-
tionally, orangutans’ more deliberate means of locomotion in
the canopy (see Povinelli and Cant 1995) may have contrib-
uted as well. However, the fact that orangutans also made
numerous mistakes in the initial trials shows that at least they
showed the same initial pull as the other ape species.
Unlike previous studies with human infants and mon-
keys (e.g., Diamond 1990; Santos et al. 1999) the visibility
of the reward had no eVect on performance. However, the
barrier in the current study was always transparent whereas
other studies made the barrier opaque, which may explain
the diVerences between studies.
Although the species diVerences reported here may rep-
resent a genuine species diVerence, caution is required for
two reasons. First, our sample size is small, and therefore
the impact of large inter-individual diVerences on the group
comparisons should not be underestimated. It is conceiv-
able that the origin of our subjects (zoo) may have had an
important eVect on performance, although we can rule that
a diVerential experimental history was responsible for the
observed diVerences between orangutans and other apes
because all species routinely received the same tests. Sec-
ond, even if the species diVerences were genuine, the
strength of the prepotent response in unsuccessful subjects
is unknown. It is conceivable that unsuccessful subjects
could learn to overcome their responses if provided with
some sort of training. In the next two experiments, we
addressed these two open questions.
Experiment 2: two training regimes for apes
In this experiment, we investigated whether subjects could
learn to refrain from reaching directly for the reward, after
implementing a special training that consisted of blocking
the baited door so that subjects were forced to use the other
door and grab the reward from behind. We divided the sub-
jects that had failed “Experiment 1” into two groups. Each
group received one of two training regimes. The Wxed
regime taught subjects to always reach through the same
door to get the reward, while the variable training regime
trained subjects to reach from both doors alternatively.
Once training was completed, we presented the visible con-
dition of “Experiment 1”.
Methods
Subjects
We included all subjects that had failed “Experiment 1”
except one gorilla and one chimpanzee that were dropped
because of their extreme side-biased responding. Thus, the
Wnal sample consisted of 5 gorillas (age range 5–25 years),
4 bonobos (age range 6–20 years) and 9 chimpanzees (age
range 5–27 years).
Materials
We used the same box and setup as in “Experiment 1” with
two exceptions. First, baiting took place behind a transpar-
ent (not an opaque) panel (80 £ 90 cm) placed between the
mesh and the box. Second, we used a piece of opaque plexi-
glass (5 £ 30 cm) placed vertically behind the door where
the reward was located to block the door movement during
training (Fig. 3).
Procedure
The basic testing procedure was the same as in “Experiment
1” except that there were two phases: training and testing.
During training, the experimenter inserted the transparent
panel between the apparatus and the subject. Then the
experimenter captured the subject’s attention, placed the
reward behind one of the doors and blocked the door verti-
cally by sliding down a piece of opaque plastic in full view
of the subject. Upon removal of the transparent panel, the
subject was allowed to approach the apparatus and take the
food by reaching through the unblocked door. As soon as
the subject acquired the food, the safety panel was lowered
and the procedure was repeated for a total of six trials. In the
Wxed training regime, the reward was always placed behind
the same door (with left/right side counterbalanced across
subjects) whereas in the variable regime, the reward
appeared equally often behind each door.
Upon completing the six training trials, subjects received
six test trials which were identical to visible trials in
Fig. 3 Picture showing the plastic piece blocking the movement of
the door to train subjects to reach indirectly for the reward278 Anim Cogn (2010) 13:273–285
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“Experiment 1”, except that we used a transparent rather
than an opaque panel to prevent subjects from reaching
before baiting was completed. On the Wrst test trial, the
reward always appeared on the opposite side from where it
was placed on the last training trial. In the rest of the trials
the order of the food location was counterbalanced across
trials. If subjects did not respond or retrieve the food during
training or test trials, the experimenter encouraged them
vocally. If subjects did not respond after 5 min, the session
ended. When subjects were not able to retrieve the food or
became unwilling to be tested on six consecutive sessions
testing stopped. All sessions were videotaped.
Design
We used a between subjects design with training condition
(Wxed/variable) as the between subjects factor. Each train-
ing condition consisted of six trials. Half of the subjects
were presented with the Wxed condition, the other half with
the variable condition. Participants were matched across
conditions on the basis of sex, age and species so that there
were no signiWcant diVerences between groups in any of
these variables.
Data scoring and analyses
We scored from the videotapes whether subjects kept
knocking against the blocked door during training and
whether they obtained the reward in the test. A second
observer coded 20% of the sessions for each of these two
variables. Inter-observer reliability was excellent for
knocking (Cohen’s kappa = 1.0) and success (Cohen’s
kappa = 0.94).
We compared the percent of correct trials before and
after training. To do so, we selected the last six trials of
“Experiment 1” and compared them to the six test trials of
the current experiment. Additionally, we compared the
overall percent of correct trials in the test as a function of
the training regime. Finally, we correlated the percent of
correct trials in the test with the percentage of trials in
which subjects knocked on the door during training for
each of the training regimes. Due to our reduced sample
size, we were unable to analyze species diVerences and
consequently, pooled all species together. We used non-
parametric statistics because the assumption of homogene-
ity of variance was not met.
Results
Two gorillas failed to learn during training and another one
quit responding during testing, and they were dropped from
subsequent analyses. Figure 4 presents the percentage of
correct trials prior and after training in the remaining
subjects. Subjects improved their performance in the test
compared to the pretest both in the Wxed (Wilcoxon test:
Z=2.41; P = 0.016) and variable condition (Wilcoxon test:
Z=2.54; P = 0.011). Additionally, there were no signiW-
cant diVerences in the test between the two training meth-
ods (Mann–Whitney test: Z=0.81;  P = 0.42). However,
the distribution of responses diVered substantially between
training regimes. Subjects in the Wxed training showed a
more restricted distribution of responses with the values
clustered around the median (inter-quartile range 50–67%;
kurtosis 3.17) whereas subjects in the variable training
showed a greater dispersal in their responses (inter-quartile
range 12.5–70%; kurtosis 1.04). We found no evidence that
either sex (Mann–Whitney test: Z=0.68; P =0 . 5 0 )  o r  a g e
(Spearman r = 0.33; P =0 . 2 0 ;   N = 17) signiWcantly aVected
performance.
Training regimes also diVered in the percentage of trials
in which subjects knocked against the plexiglass during
training. Subjects with variable training knocked the plexi-
glass signiWcantly more often than subjects with Wxed train-
ing (Mann–Whitney test: Z=2.75;  P = 0.006).
Interestingly, the percent of knocking during training pre-
dicted success during the test for the variable training regime
(Spearman  r = ¡0.83;  P = 0.003;  N = 10). Subjects who
knocked less often against the plexiglass during training per-
formed better in the test than those who knocked frequently
against the plexiglass during training. In contrast, subjects in
the Wxed training regime showed no relation between knock-
ing against the plexiglass during training and test perfor-
mance (Spearman r = ¡0.11; P = 0.81; N =7 ) .
Discussion
Most subjects could learn to overcome their prepotent
responses with little additional training (six forced trials)—
only two gorillas failed to beneWt from this training. Both
Fig. 4 Mean percentage (+SEM) of correct trials before and after
training as a function of training regime
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training regimes resulted in comparable overall levels of
eVectiveness but diVerent distributions. On the one hand,
the Wxed regime trained subjects to always reach through
one of the doors and when presented with the test, in which
the location of the reward changed from trial to trial, sub-
jects got about 50% of the trials correct because they
always reached through the same door—the one they had
been trained to use. On the other hand, the variable regime
did not train subjects to reach through one particular door,
but required the subjects to reach through diVerent doors in
diVerent trials depending on the position of the reward.
Some subjects seem to have understood this because they
did well in the test, better in general than most subjects in
the  Wxed training regime. Interestingly, those successful
subjects were also those who knocked less on the blocked
door during training. In fact, those subjects who knocked
on the door more often during training not only performed
worse than the other subjects in the variable training regime
but also generally worse than most subjects in the Wxed
training regime.
Thus, the Wxed regime trained subjects to produce a sin-
gle response and therefore was easier to acquire—all sub-
jects except one scored 50% or above. The downside of
this regime, however, was that only one subject (14%)
scored above 50%. In contrast, the variable regime trained
Xexibility, and therefore it was more eVective in the test
phase in which 40% of the subjects scored above 50% cor-
rect, but its downside was that another 40% of the subjects
scored below 20% correct. Taken together, these results
indicated that subjects could be trained to overcome their
prepotent reaching response toward the reward in a few
trials, but the training regime had a profound impact on the
Xexibility that subjects displayed during the test. In the
next experiment, we returned to the question of species
diVerences by testing additional groups of apes in the orig-
inal problem.
Experiment 3: sanctuary apes
In this experiment, we sought to conWrm the species
diVerences found in “Experiment 1” with another sample
of great apes. In this case, the apes came from sanctuaries
located in countries with wild ape populations. Unlike zoo
apes, sanctuary apes had been born in the wild and had
been transferred to sanctuaries after they became
orphaned or conWscated from humans who kept them ille-
gally as pets. At the sanctuaries, apes had the opportunity
to join other apes in social groups and spend some time
roaming the forest habitat surrounding the sanctuaries.
The inclusion of apes with diVerent rearing histories
allowed us to investigate the eVects of ape origin on
performance.
Methods
Subjects
We tested 14 bonobos (8 males and 6 females; mean age
5.5 years; range 4–8 years), 12 chimpanzees (6 males and
6 females; mean age 6.8 years; range 4–15 years), and 11
orangutans (6 males and 5 females; mean age 6.4 years;
range 4–10 years). The bonobos were housed at the Lola
Ya Bonobo sanctuary in Democratic Republic of Congo,
the chimpanzees at the Ngamba Island sanctuary in
Uganda and the orangutans belonged to the orangutan
care center and quarantine in Pasir Panjang, Kalimantan,
Indonesia. We dropped one orangutan that, instead of
reaching for the food, destroyed the testing unit. Subjects
were tested individually and they were not food- or water
deprived during testing. We included all subjects older
than 3 years of age that were available for testing at the
time.
Materials
We used the same apparatus as in “Experiment 1”.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of “Experiment 1”
except that we only used visible trials. After subjects had
entered the testing unit, the experimenter showed a food
reward to the subject and placed it behind one of the swing-
ing doors. In order to get the reward, subjects had to intro-
duce their arm through the empty door and grab the food
from behind. Subjects received one 10-trial session with the
food appearing the same number of times to the left and
right of the subject with the restriction that it never
appeared more than two times in a row on the same side.
We scored and analyzed the data in the same way as in
“Experiment 1”. In addition, we directly compared the per-
formance of zoo and sanctuary apes. To do so, we calcu-
lated the percentage of correct trials for the Wrst ten trials of
the zoo apes and compared them to the ten trials adminis-
tered to sanctuary apes.
Results
Figure 5 presents the percentage of correct trials for each
species housed at the sanctuaries. Contrary to our expec-
tations, species did not diVer signiWcantly in their ability
to obtain the reward (Kruskal–Wallis test: 2 =1 . 6 9 ;
df =2 ;   P = 0.43). Similarly, there were no signiWcant sex
(Mann–Whitney test: Z=0.91;  P = 0.36) or age diVer-
ences (Spearman r = ¡0.002;  P =0 . 9 9 ;  N = 37). How-
ever, we found important individual diVerences. One280 Anim Cogn (2010) 13:273–285
123
bonobo, two orangutans, and no chimpanzees got the
reward more often than would be expected by chance (at
least 9 out of 10 times). Furthermore, three bonobos, two
orangutans and four chimpanzees got the reward in the
Wrst trial. Only one bonobo and one orangutan solved the
problem on the Wrst trial and were above chance in the
whole session.
Sanctuary apes performed signiWcantly better than zoo
apes (Mann–Whitney test: Z=3.07;  P = 0.002) although
such a diVerence depended on the species. Sanctuary chim-
panzees and bonobos performed signiWcantly better than
their zoo counterparts (Mann–Whitney test: chimpanzees:
Z=3.05, P = 0.002; bonobos: Z=2.43, P = 0.015). In con-
trast, there were no signiWcant diVerences between the two
orangutan samples (Mann–Whitney test: Z=0.64;
P = 0.52). Combining the data from both samples revealed
a signiWcant diVerence between species (Kruskal–Wallis
test:  2 =6 . 7 9 ;  df =2 ;  P = 0.034). Orangutans performed
signiWcantly better than chimpanzees and bonobos. There
were no sex diVerences (Mann–Whitney test: Z=1.01;
P =0 . 3 1 ) .
Discussion
We partially conWrmed the results of “Experiment 1”.
Orangutans performed at comparable levels to those
observed in “Experiment 1”, thus showing good inhibitory
skills. In contrast, the chimpanzees and the bonobos in the
current experiment performed better than those included in
“Experiment 1”. Combining the data from both samples
revealed that orangutans outperformed chimpanzees and
bonobos. In general, subjects did not perform above 50%
correct, and only a minority of subjects mastered the task
by the end of testing. This attests to a considerable level of
task diYculty. In the next experiment we tested 3–5-year-
old children. These ages are particularly interesting in chil-
dren because they represent an important transition period
for inhibitory and executive function abilities (e.g., Carlson
et al. 1998; Kopp 1982).
Experiment 4: children
Methods
Subjects
Fifty-Wve children from eight schools in Leipzig partici-
pated in this experiment. These children were drawn from
the participant database from the department of develop-
ment psychology of the Max Planck institute for Evolution-
ary Anthropology. Children came from families of mixed
socio-economic backgrounds. Thirteen of these children
were dropped from the study because they did not respond
to the task or refused to be tested after a few trials. Thus,
the Wnal group consisted of 42 children: fourteen 3-year-
olds (M = 3.0; range 35–37 months), fourteen 5-year-olds
(M = 4.0; range 47–49 months) and fourteen 5-year-olds
(M = 5.0; range 59–61 months). There were equal numbers
of boys and girls in each age group.
Materials
The apparatus was identical to the one used with apes, but it
was painted diVerently (and had stickers glued on the top
and sides) to make it more attractive to children (Fig. 6).
Additionally, the door openings were padded to prevent
potential injuries. A yellow curtain with printed bears was
hanging in front of the box to prevent the child seeing the
box being baited. We used six diVerent toys as rewards that
were exchanged for small stickers that children could keep.
A pilot study showed that children in this age range were
very motivated to obtain those stickers.
Procedure
Children were tested individually by two experimenters in a
quiet room at their own school. During the walk to the test
room, both experimenters talked to the child to make her
feel comfortable with the experimenters and the new situa-
tion. Experimenter 1 asked whether the child wanted to
play a game and went inside the room and took his position
behind the box while Experimenter 2 waited outside with
the child. Upon being called by Experimenter 1, the child
and Experimenter 2 entered the room and approached the
box. The Experimenter 1 said: “Watch this (name of the
child). I am going to hide this (name of the toy). If you are
able to retrieve the (name of the toy), and bring it to Exper-
imenter 2, Experimenter 2 will give you a sticker”. While
Experimenter 1 put the toy behind one of the doors, Experi-
menter 2 kneeled down, presented the child with the stick-
ers and asked which sticker would like to have.
After the child had chosen a sticker, Experimenter 1
said: “Ok, you will get this sticker if you can bring me the
Fig. 5 Mean percentage (+SEM) of correct trials as a function of spe-
cies in “Experiment 3”
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toy”. Experimenter 2 immediately opened the curtain and
the child was allowed to approach the box and attempt to
get the toy by reaching through the doors. After the subject
got the toy, Experimenter 1 closed the curtain while saying:
“Perfect,  you  really  did  a  good  job”. Experimenter 2
rewarded the child by saying: “Perfect, you really did a
good job, now you will get the sticker”. If the subject lost
the toy, Experimenter 1 closed the curtain while saying:
“Ooohh, it does not work”. Experimenter 2 said: “Ooohh,
now you won’t get a sticker.” Then Experimenter 1 asked
whether the child wanted to try again and put a new toy
behind one of the doors. If the child solved the task on the
previous trial, it was allowed to choose a new sticker. If
children did not respond to the box or kept telling the
experimenter that they could not get the toy, Experimenter
1 encouraged them by saying: “Just try, try to get the toy”.
If the subject did not respond after approximately 5 min,
the trial ended. Experimenter 1 asked whether the child
wanted to try with a diVerent toy. When the child refused to
retrieve the toy on three consecutive trials, testing stopped.
All sessions were videotaped.
Design
We used a between subjects design with age as factor. Each
subject received one session of six trials [3 trials for each
toy location (left/right)]. The order of the location at which
the toy was placed was counterbalanced across trials using
a randomization program.
Data analysis
We used the same scoring procedure and analyses as in
“Experiment 3”. A second observer coded 20% of the
sessions. Inter-observer reliability was excellent (Cohen’s
kappa = 1.0). Additionally, we also scored the time it took
subjects to solve each trial. Inter-observer reliability was
again excellent (r = 0.93). Based on the data available in
the literature, we expected older children to perform better
than younger ones. Therefore, we used one-tailed nonpara-
metric statistics.
Results
Figure 7 presents the percentage of correct trials for each
age group (N = 14 for each group). As predicted, older chil-
dren performed signiWcantly better than younger ones
(Kruskal–Wallis test: 2 = 4.75;  df =2 ;  P = 0.047, one-
tailed). However, this diVerence was most clearly shown
when comparing 3-year-olds to 4- and 5-year-olds pooled
together (Mann–Whitney test: Z=1.91; P = 0.028). Five
4-year-olds (36%) and three 5-year-olds (21%) solved the
task whereas only one 3-year-old (7%) did so.
Analysis of the latencies indicated a signiWcant
diVerence in the time it took subjects to make a choice
Fig. 6 Testing setup for chil-
dren. The top row of pictures 
depicts a child reaching directly 
for the reward and losing it. The 
bottom row depicts a child 
reaching indirectly and getting 
the reward
Fig. 7 Mean percentage (+SEM) of correct trials as a function of age
in “Experiment 4”
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[²(2, N = 42) = 15.69; P = 0.001]. Three-year-old children
needed signiWcantly more time in comparison to 4- (68 vs.
8 s, Mann–Whitney: Z=3.81;  P = 0.001) and 5-year-old
children (68 vs. 25 s, Mann–Whitney: Z=2.99; P = 0.003).
Additionally, 75% of the 3-year-old children missed 1–3
trials because they were unable to solve the task after
approximately 5 min or indicated that it was not possible to
get the toy and refused to be tested. In contrast, only one
4-year-old child and no 5-year-old child had a trial missing.
Discussion
As expected older children outperformed younger ones in
this task. These data Wt well with other results on inhibitory
control that the age between 3 and 5 years is an important
transition period for the acquisition of inhibitory control.
Numerous studies have reported 3-year-olds having motor-
and cognitive inhibition problems in a variety of tasks
(Carlson and Moses 2001; Diamond and Taylor 1996; Frye
et al.  1995; Gerstadt et al. 1994; Mischel and Mischel
1983). However, even the performance of the older chil-
dren was quite low (between 20 and 30%) which again con-
Wrms previous studies reporting far-from-perfect
performance in these age groups (Carver et al. 2001a, b;
Carlson et al. 2002; Mischel and Mischel 1983; Mischel
et al. 1989).
We also noted that 3-year-old children needed more time
to complete a test trial. The majority of 3-year-old children
passed the 5-min limit on 1–3 test trials or indicated that
they were unable to solve the task and refused to be tested
further. At Wrst all 3-year-olds tried to reach for the toy
directly. When this strategy failed, they often stopped try-
ing and kept repeating that it was impossible to get the toy.
Others just kept looking through the door behind which the
toy was placed or tried to somehow lift it. These Wndings
might indicate that in comparison to 4- and 5-year olds,
3-year-olds might have been less able to cope with the frus-
tration of ‘losing a sticker’. Unable to activate any eYcient
solution they might have stopped trying. In contrast 4- and
5-year-olds kept trying and completed test trials more
quickly.
It is conceivable that the test setting, including being
watched by two experimenters while being unable to solve
a task might have put extra pressure on participants,
decreasing the likelihood of producing the detour-solution.
This explanation, however, cannot easily explain the
observed age diVerences. Future studies could investigate
whether children show similar performance when left alone
in the room. Being alone may have alleviated some of the
social pressure that they may have felt and additionally, not
being able to relate their failures to experimenter may have
helped them to better monitor and evaluate their own
actions.
General discussion
We found some evidence that great apes could solve the
detour-reaching task, thus inhibiting their initial tendency
to reach directly for the food. Orangutans were generally
the more skilful than the other species although unsuccess-
ful subjects showed notable improvement after minimal
training. However, the type of training substantially
aVected the subsequent task performance. Sanctuary chim-
panzees and bonobos outperformed their zoo counterparts,
but this was not the case for orangutans. Four- and 5-year-
old children outperformed 3-year-olds even though the per-
formance of the older children was far from perfect and
comparable to some of the ape groups tested.
Orangutans were the species that performed best in this
task. They appeared better able to take into account the
larger picture, generate the detour-solution and inhibit their
prepotent responses than the other species. One possible
explanation is due to the fact that they are more deliberate
than the other apes due to their means of locomotion in the
canopy. Additionally, the diVerences may have been accen-
tuated by their unique social organization based on a dis-
persed social system that reduces direct individual food
competition. As a consequence they might be less impul-
sive, less focused and better able to overview
certain situations than the other species. It is worth noting
that the orbital frontal cortex of orangutans, an area com-
monly associated with inhibitory skills, deviates from the
other species (Semendeferi et al. 1997; Semendeferi 1999).
However, other tests for inhibitory control have found no
evidence of species diVerences between orangutans, chim-
panzees and bonobos (Amici et al. 2008; Vlamings et al.
2006). Interestingly, all three species display high levels of
Wssion–fusion, a social organization in which party mem-
bership changes constantly. In contrast, gorillas, which
have a more stable social organization, showed lower levels
of inhibitory control than those species with higher levels
of  Wssion–fusion (Amici et al. 2008). Note that gorillas
were also the species that displayed more diYculties during
the training phase of “Experiment 2”, but our small sample
does not allow us to draw Wrm conclusions on this point.
Despite the great diYculty that some subjects experi-
enced with the task, they were able to improve their perfor-
mance after some minimal remedial training. The results of
this training suggested that most unsuccessful apes experi-
enced cognitive rather than motor inhibition problems. Due
to the salience of the food item subjects might have been so
focused on the door behind which the food was placed that
they were unable to detach their attention from it and take
into account other aspects of the task (the other door) that
would have allowed them to solve the task. It is important
to emphasize that the type of training had a profound
impact of the subsequent task performance. Those subjectsAnim Cogn (2010) 13:273–285 283
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trained to reach through one particular door continued to do
so during the test, which means that they failed all those tri-
als in which the food appeared in the nontrained side. Thus,
this kind of Wxed training fostered motor inXexibility
whereas training alternation between doors fostered Xexi-
bility; but this worked only for those individuals that could
inhibit reaching directly toward the reward during training.
Recall that knocking against the door during training pre-
dicted was inversely correlated with success during the sub-
sequent test phase but only for those subjects that were
trained with the alternation regime.
Research on frontal patients has indicated that insuY-
cient inhibitory control can lead to two diVerent outcomes:
(a) the inability to focus on just one thing (as measured in
for example the Stroop Test) and (b) the opposite, the
inability to expand one’s attention beyond one thing
(Diamond 1990). Frontal patients can be so focused on a
salient stimulus that they fail to take into account the larger
picture, for example alternative routes to solve a task (Luria
1973; Diamond 1990). The children and apes tested in the
present study seemed to have problems with taking into
account the larger picture too. They seemed to be so
focused on the door behind which the toy was presented
that they failed to take into account that the solution
involved the other door. Unlike apes, however, children
made no mistakes after they found the correct solution. In
pure cognitive inhibition problems, like the nine-dot prob-
lem (Maier 1930), subjects usually do not make mistake
once they know the solution. It is therefore suggested that
in contrast to the apes, children are facing pure cognitive
inhibition problems in the present detour-reaching study.
To further investigate the nature of the inhibitory prob-
lems of the children who were unable to solve the task, it
would be interesting to present children with the training
blocked condition. If performance reached perfection after
blocking, failures in the original task are likely due to cog-
nitive inhibition problems: the inability to activate a detour-
solution due to the salience of the toy. If children increased
performance but kept making mistakes, this is likely due to
motor inhibition problems: being unable to inhibit the pre-
potent direct-reaching response. In addition it would be
interesting to test older children. As reported earlier, inhibi-
tory skills continue to develop in childhood (Kopp 1982;
Mischel and Mischel 1983; Mischel et al. 1989; Carver
et al. 2001a, b; Carlson et al. 2002). Children become cog-
nitively more Xexible and are better able to disengage from
salient objects. Future studies on inhibitory skills in typi-
cally developing children are important, as inhibitory skills
are good predictors of cognitive as well as social compe-
tence, scholastic performance and the ability to cope with
stress and frustration (Mischel et al. 1989). Given the cur-
rent interest in theory of mind development, investigation
of inhibitory skills is relevant too, as theory of mind and
inhibitory skills seem to be closely related (Perner and
Lang 2002; Carlson et al. 2002; Zelazo et al. 2002).
Chimpanzees and bonobos housed in sanctuaries clearly
outperformed their counterparts housed in zoos, although
this was not true for orangutans. These diVerences are
intriguing and potentially important (Boesch 2007). How-
ever, caution is needed when trying to extrapolate these
results to the whole population of zoo or sanctuary apes
because our samples are small and come from particular
origins. Caution should also be applied with the human
sample because it may only reXect the performance of mid-
dle-class western children, and it may not be representative
of other human populations that diVer with regard to the
experiences that children are exposed to (e.g., schooling).
Moreover, the ape populations themselves are not so homo-
geneous since there are large inter-individual diVerences
within populations regarding the rearing histories of the
individuals and also potentially important genetic diVer-
ences. For instance, all zoo chimpanzees were descendants
of individuals that came from Liberia whereas all sanctuary
chimpanzees came from Eastern wild populations. Future
studies could include multiple groups that vary systemati-
cally in certain factors (e.g., rearing practices or cultural
background) to assess their impact on inhibitory control.
There is another issue that recommends caution when
making broad generalizations. Although sanctuary chim-
panzees and bonobos outperformed their zoo counterpart
on a detour-reaching task, there are other tasks in which the
pattern is reversed and these same zoo apes outperformed
sanctuary apes. For instance, zoo apes outperformed sanc-
tuary apes in quantity estimation and gaze following (com-
pare Hanus and Call 2007; Bräuer et al. 2005 with
Herrmann et al. 2007). Nevertheless, the potential diVer-
ences between populations is an important issue that
deserves careful scrutiny as it may provide important clues
regarding the epigenesis of cognitive skills in the great
apes. Documenting the diVerences is important but not less
important is documenting the similarities. In fact, there are
some tasks in which no diVerences were apparent between
zoo and sanctuary apes (e.g., quantity estimation, object
tracking tasks, see Herrmann et al. 2007; Barth and Call
2006). This means that what is required to assess the status
of various populations is a battery of multiple tasks and a
balanced consideration of the similarities and diVerences
between populations. At the very least, this manuscript
should contribute to dispel the myth that sanctuary apes are
a nonviable research population due to their origin as we
have seen that they are capable of solving tasks that chal-
lenge the inventiveness of 4- and 5-year-old children.
In summary, we found that some great apes were capa-
ble of solving a detour-reaching task after only a few trials
and those that failed could be trained to solve the task after
minimal training. However, the training regime had a284 Anim Cogn (2010) 13:273–285
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substantial eVect on how Xexibly subjects could deploy
their training in the original situation. In general, orangu-
tans outperformed other ape species, but there were also
important diVerences between groups depending on the
apes’ origin. Namely, sanctuary chimpanzees and bonobos
outperformed their zoo counterparts. Four- and 5-year-old
children performed better than 3-year-old children. Finally,
the performance of the older children was roughly equiva-
lent to that of sanctuary apes.
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